The two-price model revisited. A Minskian-Kaleckian reading of the process of 'financialization' by Passarella, Marco
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The two-price model revisited. A
Minskian-Kaleckian reading of the
process of ’financialization’
Marco Passarella
11. July 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32033/
MPRA Paper No. 32033, posted 5. July 2011 16:32 UTC
Revised: 5 July 2011 
The two-price model revisited. A Minskian-Kaleckian 
reading of the process of ‘financialization’ 
 
Marco Passarella*  
 
In Passarella (2011B) a kind of up-grading of Minsky’s economic thought was proposed, 
in which his ‘financial instability hypothesis’ was inter-bred with inputs from the 
current heterodox literature. This up-grading was done within a one-good model where 
capital goods were regarded as a mere portion of firms’ homogeneous output. This 
simplifying hypothesis did not permit us to include explicitly the ratio of the (demand) 
price of capital assets to the supply price of capital goods – i.e. the key analytical concept 
in Minsky’s theory. This paper aims to improve the simplified model provided in 
Passarella (2011B) by considering explicitly an artificial, pure credit, closed capitalist 
economy in which production firms are split into two different sectors. The result is a 
new, although paradoxical, monetary circuit model which allows us to retrieve some of 
the most disputed results of Minsky’s analysis of economic instability. 
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1. Introduction 
In Passarella (2011B) a kind of up-grading of Minsky’s economic thought has been 
proposed. More precisely, the so-called ‘financial instability hypothesis’ has been 
inter-bred with inputs both from the Theory of the Monetary Circuit and from the 
current Post-Keynesian ‘Stock-Flow Consistent’ modeling. This modification was 
done within a one-good model where capital goods were regarded as a mere portion 
of firms’ total (homogeneous) output. This simplifying hypothesis allowed us to take 
the first step towards analyzing of the effect of both ‘capital-asset inflation’ and 
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consumer credit on the financial soundness of firms’ sector. However, the very 
hypothesis of homogeneity of output did not permit us to include explicitly the ratio 
of the (demand) price of capital assets to the supply price of capital goods – that 
ratio is the key analytical device of Minsky’s theory (see, for instance, Minsky 1976, 
1977, 1982, 1986). The importance of this ratio – which roughly corresponds to the 
well-known Tobin ‘q’ – lies in the fact that, on the one hand, it allows us to regard 
inflation as a process of change in relative prices, and, on the other hand, it permits 
us to consider the relationship between financial markets and ‘productive’ 
investment. This is a crucial point in Minsky’s analysis of the causes of both financial 
fragility and economic instability.  
This paper aims to extend and improve the simplified framework provided in 
Passarella (2011B) by considering explicitly an artificial, pure credit, closed 
capitalist economy in which each production firm is assigned to one of the two 
separated sectors: a sector producing capital (or investment or intermediate) goods; 
and a sector producing consumer (or final) goods. This very feature of the model, 
accompanied by the macroeconomic condition of stock-flow consistency, is the 
reason why it can be labeled a ‘Minskian-Kaleckian’ model (according to the 
taxonomy proposed by Parguez, 2004; see also Zezza, 2004). In this current paper, 
section 2 will introduce the reader to the ‘two-price model’, regarded as the 
cornerstone of Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’. In sections 3 and 4, we will 
present a fairly straightforward, but stock-flow consistent, re-formulation of some of 
the disputed aspects of Minsky’s theory within a monetary circuit model in the 
presence of two production sectors. In sections 5 to 8, we will use this model in 
order to analyze the impact of both ‘capital-asset inflation’ and households’ 
autonomous consumption on the financial ‘soundness’ of the economy. Some 
concluding remarks will be provided in the last part of the paper. 
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2. The two-price model: an analytical overview 
As is well known, Minsky aims to join together Keynes’ investment theory of the 
cycle (given in Chapters 12 and 17 of the General Theory) with a financial theory of 
investment. The two pillars of Minskian thought are the ‘two-price model’ and the 
‘theory of increasing risk’ – both inspired by Keynes (1936) and Kalecki (1971) (see 
Papadimitriou and Wray, 2008; see also Passarella, 2010). More specifically, 
Minsky’s analysis starts from a financial re-reading of the General Theory, which he 
considered as a draft of fundamental insights, albeit a draft that contains some of the 
contradictions and contaminations of ‘Neoclassical’ doctrine from which Keynes 
claimed he wanted to break away. From a microeconomic point of view, Minsky 
suggests we switch our attention from the Keynesian ‘ambiguous’ concept of the 
‘marginal efficiency of capital’ to the price of capital assets as the key variable for the 
analysis of productive investment. In short, the higher the market value of capital 
assets, and the lower the perception of the twin risks linked to investment, then the 
higher the single firm’s investment – given the supply price of new capital goods. 
 More precisely, Minsky considers two different kinds of price: the (demand) price 
of capital assets; and the (supply) price of current output. This latter, in turn, can be 
further sub-divided into the price of production of consumer goods and the price of 
production of capital goods. These sets of prices are strictly linked, because capital 
goods ‘are a part of current output, and those [capital] goods that will be like some 
of the existing capital assets must have prices as current output consistent with their 
prices as capital assets’ (Minsky, 1986, p. 179). Hence, Minsky distinguishes (i) the 
price of capital assets, pk, that is the highest demand price that the single investing 
firm is willing to pay (and that is linked to the trend of the equity market), from (ii) 
the supply price of new capital goods, pi, which is determined by the conditions of 
production and the mark-up set by the producing sector. The former depends 
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positively on the long-run profit expectations of the investing firm (and on the 
supply of money as well); the latter depends positively on the costs of production 
and the short-run profit expectations of the producing firms. Notice that it is the 
relative dynamics of these two prices, which are set ‘in different markets and by 
different forces’ (Minsky, 1977, p. 21), that determines the real amount of 
productive investment which is undertaken by each single firm. In short, a demand 
price higher than the supply price of capital goods is what enables the investing firm 
to take advantage of undertaking investment.  
Minsky’s argument is usually represented by means of the well-known ‘two-price 
diagram’. However, we can easily translate Minsky’s insights in formal analytical 
terms as well. We obtain a system of five equations in five unknowns (I0j, pi,   
 , pkj, 
Irj), that is: 
(2.1)           
(2.2)               
(2.2’)   
                  
(2.3)                     
(2.4)       
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and where Irj   ΔKj is the total investment in new capital goods, I0j is the part of real 
investment which is financed through internal funds, Aj is the amount of internal 
funds, w is the average wage paid to each worker, ai is the average output per 
worker in the sector that produces capital goods, μ is the gross mark-up, Ri is a 
positive function of the lender’s risk, Q is the unit ‘quasi-rent’ linked to the 
investment1, rj is the discount rate used by the single firm in the absence of risks2, 
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and Rkj is a positive function of the borrower’s risk. Finally, notice that the subscript 
‘j’ is used for indicating those magnitudes which refer specifically to the single firm. 
Equation (2.1) defines the level of self-financed investment of the single 
(representative) j-th firm as the ratio between the amount of internal funds (that 
Minsky regards as ‘given’ at the micro level) and the supply price of new capital 
goods. This price is determined according the cost-plus pricing rule, as is shown in 
equation (2.2). Notice that, insofar as the amount of funds required for the planned 
investment is larger than the amount of internal funds, the firm needs to borrow 
credit-money from banks. This additional financing entails increasing costs, in the 
form of increasing interest payments, which are linked to the increase in lender’s 
risk – as is shown in equation (2.2’). Equation (2.3) shows that the demand price of 
capital assets depends positively on the flow of quasi-rents (which are derived from 
the firms’ investment), but depends negatively on the discount rate applied by the 
single firm. This rate, in turn, depends on the firm’s profit expectations and on the 
increase in borrower’s risk3. Finally, equation (2.4) provides the equilibrium 
condition, that allows the single firm to set the level of optimal real ‘productive’ 
investment. 
Clearly, the single firm keeps on investing until the (decreasing) demand price 
equals the (increasing) ‘augmented’ supply price of capital goods. In other words, 
the single firm invests if and only if, and insofar as, the demand price to supply price 
ratio – which resembles the Tobin ‘q’ – is higher than 1, that is say, 
(2.5)    
   
  
  
   
                    
   
This ratio depends positively on both the quasi-rents and the productivity of labor, 
whereas it depends negatively on the cost of the labor-force, on the quasi-rents’ 
discount rate, on the monopoly power of firms which produce capital goods, and on 
the twin-risks on the productive investment.  
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Lastly, the investment leverage ratio of the j-th firm is equal to: 
(2.6)    
   
      
 
           
                   
 1  
   
   
                
where Lkj is the amount of external funds (i.e. bank loans) that the single firm needs 
in order to finance the investment. 
Equation (2.6) shows that investment leverage ratio of the single j-th firm is an 
increasing function of planned real investment, Irj. It is here that Minsky thought he 
discovered the ‘arcane’ aspect of the instability of capitalist economies: during 
period of ‘tranquil growth’ – Minsky argued – firms are propelled to improve their 
investment plans and hence they are inclined to increase the investment leverage 
ratio. This very behavior tends to increase the financial fragility of firms’ and banks’ 
balance-sheets and, sooner or later, it will lead to the economic instability and – in 
the absence of any government (and central bank) intervention – to the crisis.  
 
3. The stock-flow consistent accounting framework 
As many authors have argued (see mainly Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2001), Minsky’s 
‘hypothesis’ of an increasing leverage is vitiated by the ‘fallacy of composition’, since 
Minsky extends to the entirety of the firms’ sector conclusions which are correct for 
the single representative firm only4. In our opinion, this conundrum can be regarded 
as a typical problem of (lack of) macroeconomic stock-flow consistency. Hence, in 
the next sections, the question of the financial fragility of a monetary economy of 
production will be developed – if not in the letter, at least in the spirit of Minsky – 
within a stock-flow consistent social accounting framework, where four different 
sectors are explicitly considered5: 
(i) households (or wage-earners), which sell their labor-power to firms in return for 
a money-wage; which purchase consumer-goods; and which hold financial assets 
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(i.e. deposits and equities, in our simplified model); 
(ii) a sector including (non-financial) firms which produce consumer-goods (‘c-
firms’, hereafter) by means of employing labor and use capital goods as inputs; 
(iii) a sector including (non-financial) firms which produce capital goods (‘i-firms’, 
hereafter) by means of employing labor as the sole input6;  
(iv) a macro-sector including a central bank and commercial banks (which lend 
credit-money to both the productive sector and the household sector) plus other 
non-bank financial operators (who create ‘quasi-money’ or ‘derivatives’).  
Both the government and foreign sector can be ignored at this stage of our 
analysis. More precisely, we will adopt an accounting structure – which represents 
the analytical ‘skeleton’ of our model – where all interest rates and rates of return 
(on bank loans, iL, on bank deposits, iD, and so on) are set at a level that remains 
fixed during a given accounting period and the corresponding interest-payments 
and returns are settled at the end of the same period7. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that: 
(i) households hold financial assets (bank deposits and equities), but do not directly 
purchase capital goods; 
(ii) c-firms not only purchase capital goods and issue equities, but can also decide to 
buy/hold financial assets (equities and derivatives); 
(iii) i-firms finance their current production by means of bank loans only, whereas 
they do not purchase capital goods8, do not issue equities and do not buy financial 
assets; 
(iv) banks and financial intermediaries issue financial assets (i.e. newly issued 
equities – which are bought by households – and ‘derivatives’ – which are bought by 
c-firms) and hold a percentage of c-firms’ capital stock. 
Finally, following both Minsky (1986) and other today’s Post-Keynesians (see, for 
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instance, Dos Santos, 2006), we reject the traditional distinction among commercial 
banks, on the one hand, and investment banks plus other non-bank financial 
intermediaries, on the other hand. We will include all these actors in the same 
sector, labeled ‘Banks and NBFI’ (where ‘NBFI’ stands for ‘Non-Banking Financial 
Intermediaries’). Notice that this allows us to consider the deep changes which have 
occurred (especially) in the Anglo-Saxon banking system during the last twenty 
years. Moreover, we assume here that households are able to obtain bank loans in 
order to finance consumption, even beyond the limit of their disposable income. 
More specifically, we will assume that the amount of bank loans received by 
households is an increasing function of their wealth (and hence of the inflation in the 
stock market). The reason is that in the last few decades, Anglo-Saxon households 
have been embedded in the frenzy of financial markets by virtue of their holdings of 
shares, of their ‘stakes’ in supplementary pensions, and so on. This process has also 
allowed households to borrow on the basis of the value of their own stock of assets9.  
 Previous assumptions are summarized in a consistent set of sectoral balance-
sheets where every financial asset has a counterpart liability, and the budget 
constraints of each sector describe how the balance between flows of expenditure, 
factor income and transfers generate counterpart changes in the stocks of assets and 
liabilities (see Lavoie and Godley, 2001-02)10. More precisely, the top part of Table 1 
is the transaction flow matrix of a capitalist, ‘pure credit’, closed economy that has 
two ‘productive’ sectors. For instance, row 1 of Table 1 shows the flow of final 
consumption expenditure from the household sector to c-firms; row 4 shows the 
flow of ‘passive’ interest-payments on bank loans going from private sector 
(households and firms) to banking-financial sector; and so on. The bottom part of 
the matrix shows the uses and sources of funds of the economy – that is to say, 
shows the monetary budget constraint faced by each economic sector. More 
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precisely, this part shows ‘how the sectoral balance sheets are modified by current 
flows’ (Dos Santos, 2005, p. 719). Notice that loans borrowed by firms are of a 
‘residual’ and ‘revolving’ kind (namely, as the external resources that firms need to 
fund both non-self-financed investment and current production), whereas bank 
lending to households is of a different ‘nature’, since it entails an additional and 
(potentially) lasting debt. Finally, notice that each column (representing a sector) 
and each row (representing a flow of transactions) of Table 1 must sum to zero. This 
means that, within this accounting framework, ‘every flow comes from somewhere 
and goes somewhere’ (Godley, 1999B, p. 394) and, hence, ‘there are no [accounting] 
black holes’ (Godley, 1996, p. 7). 
 
4. The ‘new’ monetary-financial circuit 
We know that a distinctive feature of a growth-oriented productive system – such as 
the one analyzed by Keynes and, in the wake of him, further analyzed by Minsky 
(until the 1980s at least) – is the major role of banks in the financing of production 
(and investment in capital goods), where security market plays a passive role in 
channeling household saving towards production firms. However, as Mario 
Seccareccia has asserted in a recent (unpublished) work, since the end of the 1970s 
financial markets have taken on a central role in Western economies. In fact, 
‘growing profits and retained earnings associated with a relatively weak business 
investment have slowly transformed (or “rentierized”) the non-financial business 
sector itself into a net lender’ (Seccareccia, 2010, p. 4) that seeks higher financial 
returns on its internal funds. At the same time, households’ saving has fallen 
drastically: since the 1990s, the household sector in many Anglo-Saxon countries 
has increasingly become a net borrower, rather than a net lender (which has long 
been considered as one of the ‘traditional’ economic roles of the household sector). 
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On the money-supply side, banks have become ‘financial conglomerates’ that 
seek to maximize their fees and commissions by issuing and managing assets in off-
balance-sheet affiliate structures. This has produced a change in the structure of the 
monetary circuit, where the banking system is assumed to finance the activity of the 
business sector (current production and, at a lower level of abstraction, investment 
plans). In the era of the so-called ‘Money Manager Capitalism’, the traditional link 
between production firms and banks ‘has been largely severed […] and it is the 
dynamics of the banks/financial markets axis […] which has taken center stage’ 
(Seccareccia, 2010, p. 6). 
 In Fig. 1 the simplest version of the monetary circuit is represented by the 
sequence (1)-(5). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that households use their 
incomes (i.e. both labor- and capital-incomes) to buy commodities and/or securities 
issued by c-firms, and we exclude (again by assumption) any possibility of an 
increase in households’ holdings of bank deposits. In short, within a closed 
monetary economy of production, the logical sequence is: (1) banks grant credit to 
the industrial firms, enabling them to start the process of production (as well as to 
finance each single investment plan – but notice that the purchase of capital-goods is 
an exchange ‘internal’ to the production sector); (2) firms use the initial finance to 
pay the money wage-bill to households in return for the labor-power that those 
firms need; (3.a and 3.b) once the production process in any given period is 
completed, households spend a percentage of their income in the commodity market 
and hold the rest in the form of financial assets (equities issued by c-firms, in our 
simplified model); (4) the liquidity (notably credit-money) that is spent in both the 
equity market and the commodity market comes back to the production sector; (5) 
insofar as this sector gets back its monetary advances, it is able to repay (the 
‘principal’ of) its bank debt11. 
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 As has already been mentioned, the process of ‘financialization’ has involved a 
remarkable change in the historical structure of the monetary circuit. The strategic 
position of the banking system and the financial market in the new capitalism is 
depicted in Fig. 2. On the one hand, the creation of credit-money has been 
increasingly sustained by households’ debt, Lh, rather than by the demand for 
finance of the production sector (see arrow (1) in Fig. 2). On the other hand, 
households’ debt has fuelled the transactions on the financial markets (both on the 
equity market and on the market for derivatives – i.e. ‘bank bonds’, within our 
simplified model) because of the demand arising from the growth in ‘saving’ (i.e. 
money profits) of the c-firms (see arrow (3) in Fig. 2)12. In short, the sequence which 
marks the ‘new’ monetary circuit is virtually opened by the decision of banks to 
grant credit (not only to industrial firms, but also) to households on the basis of 
their wealth – i.e. the stock of financial assets hoarded by households (arrow (1)). 
Households spend both this credit-money and (a proportion of) their income in the 
commodity market (arrow (2)). Insofar as c-firms are able to fund their desired real 
investment plans, they can assign a percentage of their retained earnings to both the 
equity market and the market in derivatives. In the former, c-firms can re-purchase 
a proportion of their own shares – either from other c-firms or from households and 
banks (arrows (4.b)-(4.c))13. In the latter, banks and NBFI place derivatives (for 
instance, collateralized debt obligations or CDOs) which are indirectly ‘monetized’ 
by c-firms’ saving (arrows (3)-(4.a))14. This happens because, in the presence of 
rising prices and returns in the financial markets, it may become profitable for over-
capitalized c-firms ‘to allocate excess capital to financial assets in preference to 
engaging in real investment’ (Michell, 2010, p. 20). The final outcome is that 
production firms assume the role of net lender, whereas households become net 
borrowers.  
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5. Initial finance and the financing of investment 
The paradoxical form of the new monetary circuit, which is depicted in Fig. 2, can be 
analyzed in a SFC manner with the assistance of Table 115. In this regard, it is 
assumed that productive firms express two different kinds of demand for bank 
loans: (i) the stricto sensu ‘initial finance’ (Lw = Lcw + Liw) which the industrial sector 
as a whole needs to fund current production and which covers the cost of 
production (i.e. the wage-bill); (ii) a further demand for credit (Lk), allowing each 
single c-firm to fund that part of investment which cannot be financed by internal 
resources16. The amount of initial loans demanded (and obtained, by assumption), 
respectively, by c-firms, by i-firms and by the production sector as a whole, are17: 
(5.1)                         
(5.2)             
(5.3)                       
where λc is the residual share of investment funded by bank loans (namely, the 
investment leverage ratio of c-firms).  
At the end of the process of production, households can purchase consumer 
goods and/or save a share of their income, thereby increasing their stock of 
(financial) assets. If we assume that households can also borrow credit-money in 
order to fund their ‘extra’ consumption (i.e. in order to achieve the ‘desired’ level of 
consumption), then their ‘augmented’ budget constraint is18: 
(5.4)                                      
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that: (i) bank loans (i.e. consumer credit) to 
households can be expressed as a proportion, c2, of the value of households’ stocks 
of assets (including capital gains, see the last row of the first column of Table 1); (ii) 
the interest rate on bank deposits is negligible; (iii) banks and NBFI do not face any 
cost of production, and use entirely any level of their net receipts to purchase 
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equities issued by c-firms19; (iv) banks and NBFI do not issue shares; (v) households 
divide their savings between c-firms’ equities and zero-interest bank deposits only. 
Given these premises, we have:  
(5.5)                           )   
(5.6)                  
(5.7)                        
(5.8)                                
(5.9)                                               
where Vh–1 is the households’ wealth at the end of the previous period, ΔENc is the 
quantity of new shares issued by c-firms net of any stock buy-back, and σ is the ratio 
of stock buy-back to current issues.  
 Equation (5.9) shows that the ‘net’ demand for equities of c-firms arises from 
households’ saving (although in decreasing terms as the process of financialization 
takes off) and banks’ net receipts. Notice that if firms decide to use their retained 
earnings in order to re-purchase part of their capital stock from households, then 
the current net change that is described by the left-hand term of (5.8) may become 
negative – this will be so if σ > 1. In this case, households and banks could spend the 
resulting additional flow of credit-money only for consumption. Consequently, even 
in the presence of any re-purchasing of shares, there is only one circumstance which 
can produce a net loss of liquidity for c-firms as a whole: the decision of the other 
sectors to save a percentage of their income in the form of liquid balances (i.e. bank 
deposits, in this simplified model). Finally, if we divide (5.9) by ΔENc (and then 
substitute, using (5.8), for ΔENc ), we obtain: 
(5.9’)      
                    
        
  
that is to say, the price of a share in a c-firm is, ceteris paribus, a positive function 
both of the banks’ demand (and hence of the banks’ profits) and of the buy-back of c-
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firms’ shares20. 
 In order to analyze – still within a SFC basic model of monetary circuit – the effect 
of inflation in the prices of capital assets on the behavior of the productive sector, 
we have to introduce the Kaleckian macroeconomic equations of profits. From the 
second column of Table 1 we obtain: 
(5.10)                     
(5.11)                 
(5.12)                         
Notice that equation (5.10) is determined before investment: profits from sales are 
one of the sources used by c-firms in order to fund the purchase of capital goods 
(which will be employed from the next period). Notice also that the rate of return on 
bank bonds (iB) is directly linked to the rate of interest on households’ debt (iL). 
More precisely, banks and NBFIs issue ‘bonds’ which are subscribed by c-firms 
which are looking for higher returns on their capital21. This process allows banks 
and NBFIs to ‘monetize’ a percentage (call it α) of their credit with households 
without waiting until the maturity-date. However, in order to do so, the rate of 
return on issued bonds must be higher than the rate on bank deposits and lower 
than (or equal to) the rate on bank loans to households (iD < iB ≤ iL). 
   
6. The effect of ‘financialization’ on firms’ profits 
Now, let us consider two different cases. Case 1. We assume initially that: (i) the 
investment in capital goods is entirely financed by the issuing of new equities (so 
that piΔK = pEcΔENc and ΔLf = Lcw + Liw); (ii) c-firms do not distribute dividends and 
banks do not issue shares (so that Fc = 0, θc  1 and ΔEb = 0)22; (iii) the rate of return 
on bank bonds is negligible (iB = 0). Using (5.9) and (5.4) into (5.10), (5.11) and 
(5.12), we get: 
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(5.10’)                           
(5.11’)                            
(5.12’)           
and hence: 
(6.1)                             
(6.2)                             
(6.3)             
Inequality (6.1) shows that c-firms’ profits from sales are positive if the ‘external’ 
demand for consumption (i.e. consumer credit plus wages paid by i-firms) is larger 
than the sum of interest-payments (paid to banks by households and c-firms) and 
households’ savings. Inequality (6.2) shows that i-firms’ profits are positive if the 
sum of c-firms’ equities purchased by households and interest-payments to banks 
(paid by households and c-firms) is larger than i-firms’ cost of labor. Finally, 
inequality (6.3) shows that total receipts from sales – made by production sector as 
a whole – are enough to pay back what the firms have borrowed (i.e. principal plus 
interest) and to provide a positive total net money profit, if the amount of bank 
credit to households is larger than the amount of deposits that households (decide 
to) hold. The conclusion is that production firms (considered as a wholly integrated 
sector) realize money profits if households are net debtors with the banking sector – 
and, hence, firms are net creditors. 
 Case 2. Let us suppose that: (i) c-firms’ investment in capital goods can be debt-
financed; (ii) the rate of return on bank bonds is positive, allowing c-firms to realize 
financial gains. If we continue to assume that c-firms do not distribute dividends and 
banks do not issue shares, then the amount of money profits of firms becomes: 
(5.10’’)                                
(5.11’’)                                
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(5.12’’)                            
and, remembering (5.5), we obtain: 
(5.12’’’)                                            
where α is the percentage of the loans made by banks to households which have 
been turned into bank bonds (or ‘securitized’)23. Equation (5.10’’) shows that c-
firms’ profits depend positively (also) on the return on bank bonds. Equation (5.11’’) 
shows that i-firms’ profits are affected positively (also) by the amount of bank 
financing for investment. Finally, equations (5.12’’) and (5.12’’’) confirm that, ceteris 
paribus, the higher the amount of loans borrowed by production sector, the higher 
will be the level of investment in capital goods, and the higher will be the net money 
profit gained by the production sector as a whole. 
Notice, however, that the profitability of the production sector is now positively 
affected also by both the level of the receipts from the ‘investment’ in financial 
assets (i.e. bank bonds, in this simplified model) and the wealth of households, 
including capital gains realized on the equity market. More precisely, the inflation in 
the price of equities has two positive effects: first, it increases the amount of 
consumer credit and hence sustains c-firms’ profits from sales; second, the interest 
accruing to the debt of households is a financial gain for c-firms. Notice also that, 
since inflation in the price of capital assets allows c-firms to replace their 
borrowings (from the banks) by equity financing, then ‘capital-asset inflation’ 
reduces the monetary cost of such financing. Nonetheless, if we admit that banks 
spend all of their receipts, then interest-payments on loans are never a ‘real’ cost for 
the production sector, because they flow back to it in the form of higher 
consumption and/or higher equity-financing. This is the reason why interests 
accruing on bank loans to firms do not appear in the equation (5.12’’’)24. 
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7. Prices, distribution and growth 
As is well known, Post-Keynesians and ‘circuitist’ authors reject the neoclassical 
theory (both the early ‘marginalist’ one and its subsequent developments) of prices, 
distribution and employment. In its stead, they follow a formulation which is very 
close to the approach developed by Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Robinson and – although 
with some differences – by Michał Kalecki (see Graziani, 2003). In the course of this 
section, we will follow the specific approach adopted by Minsky, according to whom 
the investment decision is linked to the assessment of financial markets. However, 
we will substitute the demand function of capital goods, adopted by Minsky in his 
‘two-price model’, with a modified version of the ‘accelerator’ of investment. 
Furthermore, we will suppose that, in the medium-run, the price of capital goods is 
linked to the demand price of new equities issued by c-firms in order to finance (a 
portion of) the ‘productive’ investment25. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume also that: (i) the effect of the lender’s risk is 
exogenously given (and incorporated in the interest rate, iL); (ii) the borrower’s risk 
is a function, R, of the excess of planned investment over internal funds26; (iii) prices 
are fixed according to the Kaleckian principle of cost-plus pricing; (iv) c-firms can 
distribute dividends, so that their share of retained earnings (net of bank interest) is 
0 ≤ θc ≤ 1; (v) banks issue ‘derivatives’ (but not equities), and they use their profits 
in order to purchase equities issued by c-firms only; (vi) the interest rate on 
deposits is nil; (vii) households spend a share of their income for consumption and 
hold the rest in the form of c-firms’ equities; (viii) there is an infinite supply of labor 
at the going wage; (ix) c-firms sell whatever is demanded, no more and no less; (x) 
households have correct expectations regarding their incomes; (xi) the gross mark-
up is exogenously given27. Finally, we consider a medium-run (logical) time-horizon, 
characterized by the presence of free mobility of capital and output between 
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sectors28. We obtain a system of twenty-one  equations in twenty-one unknowns29, 
that is: 
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(7.21)                   
Equation (7.1) defines the well-known national income identity in a closed economy 
without government sector. Equation (7.2) provides a modified version of the 
‘accelerator’ of productive investment. It shows that investment planned by c-firms 
is an increasing function of the expected demand and it is a decreasing function of 
the rate of interest, of the borrower’s risk and of the degree of securitization, given 
the supply price of capital goods30. Equation (7.3) provides the supply price of new 
capital goods (which is fixed by i-firms). Equation (7.4) shows that the borrower’s 
risk is an increasing function of the excess of investment over internal funds. 
Equation (7.5) provides the supply price of consumer goods. Equation (7.6) defines 
the equilibrium condition between supply and households’ demand of consumer 
goods, from which we obtain the quantity of this kind of goods. Equation (7.7) 
shows that loans to households are a percentage of their own wealth. Equation (7.8) 
defines the change in the households’ wealth. Equations (7.9) and (7.21) define 
dividends to households and banks, respectively. Equations (7.10), (7.11) and (7.12) 
show that the amount of supplied labor adjusts to labor demand coming from 
production firms31. Equation (7.13) defines the (proportion of) debt-financed real 
investment as the ratio of external funds to the price of one capital good. Equations 
(7.14) and (7.15) replicate equations (5.10) and (5.11), respectively. Equations 
(7.16) and (7.17) correspond to (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. Equations (7.18) to 
(7.20) show the link between the capital good market and the equity market. More 
precisely, they jointly determine the price of new equities issued by c-firms (and 
purchased by banks and households). 
 As we have already mentioned, c-firms keep on investing until the (decreasing) 
demand price of capital assets is equal to the supply price of capital goods – that is to 
say, until: 
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(7.18’)    
   
  
  
                 
           
 
  
      
       
Notice that this latter refers to the entirety of c-firms, and not to the single 
representative firm. Equation (7.18’) shows that the higher the households’ saving  
and the higher the banks’ net receipts (both held in the form of c-firms’ equities), the 
higher will be the profitability of engaging in productive investment (given both the 
condition of the production of capital goods and the quantity of equity-financed 
investment).  
There is also another relative price (within this model) that is worth some 
comment – namely, the relative price of manufactured goods:  
(7.22)  
  
  
 
                
         
 
  
  
 
   
 
   
which is seen to depend not only on the technique of productions, but also on the 
general (gross) mark-up. More precisely, the lower the productivity of c-firms and 
the higher the mark-up, the higher will be the price of consumer goods with respect 
to the price of capital goods.  
 Finally, it is easy to verify that (within this simplified model) the distribution of 
income among sectors depends on both the mark-up (μ) set by firms (on the ground 
of their degree of monopoly) and the level of the bank interest rate (iL). More 
precisely, the former defines the composition of output (i.e. the ‘division’ of output 
between capital goods and consumer goods – given both the scale of production, N, 
and the technique of production embedded in ac, ai and b), whereas the latter (i.e. 
the interest rate) defines the share in consumption of the banking-financial sector32. 
Consequently, the potential purchasing power (i.e. the total real wage, Nw/pc) of 
households can be regarded – in Sraffa’s words – as the ‘dependent variable’ in 
income distribution33. 
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8. Leverage ratios and firms’ financial fragility 
As usual in the post-Keynesian literature, the bank debt that has been incurred by c-
firms in order to fund the purchase of capital goods is the residual term to close the 
gap between planned investment and internal funds (i.e. equity finance plus retained 
earnings)34, that is:   
(8.1)                                       
This latter is none other than the Kaldorian budget-constraint for investment-
expenditure undertaken by the c-firms’ sector; this constraint is derivable from the 
second column of Table 1. 
We are now able to determine the marginal leverage ratio associated with c-
firms’ investment decisions, that is: 
(8.2)      
            
    
   
from which – after a number of algebraic manipulations, and remembering 
equations (7.1) to (7.21) – we obtain: 
(8.2’)     
   
  
 
         
 
 
 
    
                    
where ch is the share of households’ ‘autonomous’ consumption (i.e. consumer credit 
net of interest-payments owed to the banks) in national income, k is the share of 
new ‘productive’ investment in national income, vi is the share of wages paid by i-
firms (minus total households’ saving) in national income, and e is the number of 
new shares per unit of real investment. It is easy to verify that c-firms’ investment 
leverage ratio increases as the real investment proceeds (i.e. as k increases). This 
situation corresponds precisely to the well-known Minskian hypothesis. Notice 
further that c-firms’ leverage is affected positively by the bank interest rate, whereas 
it is affected negatively by the current ‘net’ demand for consumption (i.e. consumer 
credit plus wages paid by i-firms), by the share of retained earnings and by the 
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percentage of equity-financed investment35. 
 By contrast, the financial ‘soundness’ of i-firms is affected positively as 
investment increases. Indeed, a rising rate of investment entails rising flow of 
receipts (in the form of bank deposits) into the coffers of i-firms. This is the reason 
why, provided that we regard productive firms as an integrated and consolidated 
sector, the investment marginal leverage ratio needs not to grow. In formal terms, if, 
for the sake of simplicity, we assume that c1 = 1, then: 
(8.3)      
             
    
  
  
 
    
 
 
    
       
Consequently, if at least one of households’ autonomous consumption or the share 
of equity-financed investment is positive (i.e. ch > 0, given θc > 0; and/or qe/ε > 0), 
then the resulting variation in the investment leverage ratio of the production sector 
is negative. However, in the presence of firms’ stock-buyback the number of new 
shares per unit of real investment, e, can become negative, thereby producing an 
increase in the leverage ratio. 
Notice that, although the financial soundness of the whole productive sector does 
not seem to deteriorate as the investment proceeds (given both the rate of retention 
and the percentage of stock-buyback), it remains true that the very interconnection 
of firms’ cash-flows, in the presence of high imbalances in firms’ balance-sheets, 
could make the economic system more and more fragile36. More precisely, during 
phases of euphoric growth, signed by increasing asset prices and high ‘autonomous’ 
consumption, the perception of the risk linked to the investment decreases and this 
makes the demand price of capital goods, and hence q, grow. Notice that, to that 
extent that any ‘extra’ profits from sales are enough to fund the investment, c-firms 
do not need to get into debt and hence they are characterized by hedge financing 
(i.e. λc and λf decrease). In this phase, inflation in the money values of capital assets 
transforms financial markets into a (potential) source of ‘low-cost’ financing – 
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thereby making these markets an alternative to bank loans as source of finance. 
Initially at least, this process may have effects that are stabilizing – and not de-
stabilizing, as Minsky would have expected – on c-firms’ balance-sheets; and the 
same goes for the i-sector, because it benefits from the increasing demand for capital 
goods induced by such ‘low-cost’ funding37. 
However, we can suppose that, as the process of ‘financialization’ proceeds, c-
firms are prone to use (a growing part of) their liquidity in order to purchase 
financial assets (i.e. derivatives and/or their own shares), instead of purchasing 
capital goods. In the presence of an ‘easy’ monetary policy of the central bank – i.e. a 
policy that allows asset-values to keep on growing – this process can, theoretically, 
continue without end. However, notice that: (i) if c-firms reduce their purchase of 
capital goods (below a given threshold), then i-firms may have selling problems; (ii) 
c-firms are driven to use leverage (and hence to have ‘over-resort’ to bank debt) by 
purchasing financial assets, in order to increase the return on their capital; (iii) in 
the course of time, the buy-back of stock reduces the resilience of the c-sector’s 
balance-sheet, because it increases the leverage ratio on real (and financial) 
investments – as e decreases more quickly than q increases38. The combined effect of 
these factors can drive the system from a ‘hedge’ position to a ‘speculative’ situation 
– according to the well-known Minskian taxonomy. 
 
9. Final remarks 
In this paper, we have tried to provide a simplified, but stock-flow consistent, re-
interpretation of some of the most disputed aspects of Minsky’s theory of financial 
fragility and economic instability, by cross-breeding his ‘two-price model’ with 
inputs both from the Circulation approach and from current Post-Keynesian 
modeling. The result is a new, although paradoxical, monetary-financial circuit 
24  M. Passarella 
 
model in which the creation of credit-money is sustained by households’ debt, rather 
than by the demand by firms for finance – and it is this selfsame debt of households 
that fuels the expansion of the financial market. In short, the sequence which leads 
(within this simplified circuit model) to financial fragility and to the crisis can be 
split into two different phases. Initially, consumer credit and (the resulting) ‘capital 
asset inflation’ have a positive effect on the financial structure of the production 
sector. We can assume that both factors are the result of households’ attempt to 
keep a given ‘desired’ level of consumption – for instance, in spite of a long-term 
decrease in their wage-receipts39. In the course of this phase, c-firms are driven to 
use their receipts in order to purchase financial assets, and this very inflow of new 
funds stimulates activity in the financial markets. During the second phase of 
‘financialization’, this latter shows its negative face, because of the combined effect 
of: (i) the stagnation of ‘productive’ investment; (ii) the ‘financialization’ – and the 
resulting over-indebtness – of firms producing final goods; (iii) the reduction in the 
percentage of equity-financed investment (linked to firms’ buy-back of shares) along 
with the decline in the percentage of retained earnings. Eventually, both the increase 
in the price of assets and the decreasing creditworthiness of firms can lead to an 
increase in the effective rate of interest40. In the course of time, the growing financial 
fragility of firms, the increase in the bank interest-rate, and the resulting reduction 
in the value of households’ stock of assets, affect consumption and investment, 
thereby giving rise to the crisis.  
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Footnotes 
(*) ‘Hyman P. Minsky’ Department of Economics, University of Bergamo, Via dei Caniana 2, 
Bergamo, Italy (e-mail: marco.passarella@unibg.it; web: http://www.marcopassarella.it/). 
(1) Minsky’s definition of ‘quasi-rents’ is: the (expected) income cash-flows net of current costs – 
which roughly correspond to the (expected) money profits. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
capital goods last indefinitely and that the flow of quasi-rents can be likened to a perpetual revenue. 
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(2) Notice that, since we have implicitly assumed that the amount of quasi-rents is ‘given’ and 
‘certain’, it is the discount rate that embodies the firm’s profit expectations. This rate can be likened to 
Keynes’ ‘marginal efficiency of capital’ (in its genuine meaning).  
(3) Following Keynes, Minsky distinguishes two different kinds of risk – the borrower’s risk and the 
lender’s risk – both increasing as the real investment increases. The borrower’s risk has a ‘subjective’ 
nature and is linked to the reduction of the firm’s margins of safety. As a firm incurs more and more 
debt, the rate at which the firms’ flow of quasi-rents is discounted grows, thereby generating a 
decrease in the expected current value of investment and a fall in the price of capital assets. Even the 
nature of the lender’s risk is subjective, since it depends on the expectations of banks that lend to firms, 
but this risk becomes ‘objective’ when quantitative magnitudes become incorporated in credit 
agreements in terms of higher interest-payments (and other financial burdens). 
(4) As Toporowski has effectively argued, the point is that, even if rising investment entails rising 
debt (in the form of bank loans), it also entails rising profits (in the form of bank deposits held by firms 
producing capital goods), with the asset side of firms’ balance sheets becoming ‘more, not less, liquid as 
debt-financed investment proceeds’ (Toporowski, 2008, p. 734). In formal terms, the amount Aj of 
internal funds of the single firm (in equation (2.1)) is not ‘given’, but it is determined, in turn, by  
investment decisions undertaken by firms as a whole. At the macro-level, internal funds correspond to 
the total amount of (retained) profits and, hence, to (a share of) the aggregate investment. 
(5) Notice that, although, in principle, it should be valid for any consistent model, the definition 
‘stock-flow consistent’ usually refers to a specific set of Post-Keynesian simulation models mainly 
developed by Wynne Godley (see Godley 1996, 1999A, 1999B; Lavoie and Godley, 2001-02; Godley and 
Lavoie, 2007A, 2007B). For a complete overview of this kind of model, see Dos Santos (2005). On 
possible problems and limits of the current stock-flow consistent literature, see Michell (2010). 
(6) The rationale is that investment (i.e. the purchase of capital goods) is an exchange that is 
‘internal’ to this sector. This hypothesis is used also in a number of recent ‘agent-based models’ dealing 
with the bankruptcy diffusion (see, for instance, Delli Gatti et al., 2006). 
(7) Notice that if one wants to set out a simulation model, this assumption must be dropped, 
because it could produce an excessive ‘simultaneity’. 
(8) See footnote 6. 
(9) For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the paper we will assume that households’ savings can 
take the form of either bank deposits or equities. However, this framework can be easily improved in 
order to consider explicitly the possibility, for households, of holding other kinds of assets (e.g. 
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buildings, Treasury bills, and so on). 
(10) In this sense, the SFC modeling is the best way to develop the Minskian notion of the ‘firm’ as a 
balance sheet of assets and liabilities (in a world marked by radical uncertainty), as opposed to the 
traditional notion of the firm as a (completely rational and foresighted) individual agent who ‘merely’ 
combines the factors of production. 
(11) For the moment, the question of the repayment of interest (in monetary terms) on bank loans 
is left aside. Notice also that if households do not hoard deposits, then the entirety of the sums paid by 
firms as dividends on shares flows back to the firm sector. For a complete analytical description of the  
monetary circuit, see Graziani (2003). 
(12) Notice that bank loans which fund households’ ‘autonomous’ consumption turn into an 
equivalent amount of bank deposits received by the production sector. This amount of deposits (in 
excess of the funds needed to undertake the production and the investment) gives rise to a process of 
‘over-capitalization’ and allows firms to invest in financial assets (see Toporowski, 2008; and Michell, 
2010). 
(13) The reasons why the single firm would decide to buy back its shares are: (i) to sustain the 
price of equities; (ii) to maintain a given level of its own internal liquidity; (iii) to realize capital gains; 
(iv) to implement a ‘distributional’ mechanism. 
(14) For instance, with the intermediation of pension and investment funds. For the sake of 
simplicity, we will assume both in Table 1 and in the following equations that firms subscribe directly 
non-specific ‘bank bonds’. 
(15) Among the works suggesting an integration between the SFC Post Keynesian modeling and the 
theory of monetary circuit, see Godley (1999B), Godley and Lavoie (2007A), Lavoie (2004, 2006), Zezza 
(2004, 2011), Keen (2009) and Pilkington (2009). For an opposite opinion that, on the whole, is critical 
of the monetary circuit approach (which is regarded as a mere ‘pedagogical’ instrument), see Cavalieri 
(2003). 
(16) According to Graziani, firms ‘need finance in order to set up and carry on any kind of 
production’. Hence, a bank loan ‘must cover the cost of total production and is not confined to financing 
specifically the production of capital goods’ (Graziani, 2003, p. 69). However, Graziani himself admits 
that, insofar as we abandon the conception of the firm sector as one that is fully integrated and we 
consider a multiplicity of units, ‘in order to buy finished [capital] goods, firms need finance as much 
they need finance for paying the wage-bill in the labour market’ (Graziani, 2003, p. 99). 
(17) Notice that Lw must be borrowed at the beginning of the period, whereas one should assume 
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that Lk is demanded when production (of capital goods) has been completed. For the sake of simplicity, 
we will leave aside this distinction hereafter, and we will keep on assuming that the whole bank loan is 
borrowed at the beginning of the period. 
(18) For a detailed glossary of symbols, we refer the reader to Table 2. 
(19) As Zezza has argued, if we model a single monetary circuit, ‘the rationale for banks asking for 
interest payments is either to pay for their “cost of production” … or to distribute profits to bank 
owners, or to cumulate wealth, and since we can rule out that banks cumulate wealth in the form of 
their own deposits, we can safely assume that any level of undistributed profits obtained by the 
banking sector is used entirely to purchase equities’ (Zezza, 2011, p. 6; see also Zezza, 2004). Notice 
that Zezza’s hypothesis that the ‘financial period’ (which starts when the bank loan is created, and ends 
when the loan is paid back) is longer than the ‘production period’ (in which firms recover liquidity 
from sales and pay the interest to banks, which, in turn, spend this liquidity to purchase goods and/or 
equities from firms), allows us to treat interest payments consistently. On this disputed issue, known as 
the ‘paradox of profits’, see also Parguez (2003), Lavoie (2004), and Bellofiore and Passarella (2009). 
(20) See footnote 13. 
(21) This happens to the extent that opportunities for profitable ‘productive’ investment by c-firms 
have been exhausted or, in general, to the extent that the rate of profit on further investment is less 
than the rate of return to be obtained from buying financial products. 
(22) In this case, the reason for purchasing c-firms’ equities is the wish to realize capital gains. 
(23) So that we have: iBΔB = αiLΔLh. 
(24) Herein lies another possible difference with respect to the traditional monetary circuit 
approach. While, in the eyes of Graziani (2003), interest paid on securities is never a real cost to firms 
(apart from a possible ‘income effect’), he regards the interest paid on bank loans as representing a real 
subtraction from firms’ profit. Notice also that if we assume that c-firms target their entrepreneurial 
profit, then ‘any increase in interest costs will be carried into higher prices. In other words, increases in 
interest rates will not lead to a fall in the share of income going to entrepreneurial profit, but it will lead 
to a fall in the real wage rate and in the share of wages’ (Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p. 265). 
(25) In the medium run, this price should correspond, in turn, to the expected present value of the 
series of future ‘quasi-rents’ from a unit of the capital good – see equations (2.3) and (2.4). 
(26) Unlike Minsky, who considered equities as ‘one class of outside funds’ (Minsky, 1976, p. 107; 
quoted in Lavoie, 1986-1987, p. 260), we regard equities as a source of internal funds. 
(27) This assumption is not only adopted by Kalecki and by other Post-Keynesian authors, but also 
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by a number of mainstream economists (notably, by the so-called ‘New Keynesians’). 
(28) Notice that if one considers n firms (or sectors) producing n different goods (with n ≥ 2), then 
the usual ‘circuitist’ short-run hypothesis that states supplies are given in real terms becomes 
inconsistent with the hypothesis of profit equalization. From a medium-run (reproduction) 
perspective, the solution ‘is found in dropping the condition of given supplies’ (Lunghini and Bianchi, 
2004, p. 155), so that prices spring from the methods of production. This is the perspective adopted by 
Sraffa (1960) and by the current surplus approach. On the possibility of inter-breeding the circulation 
approach with the surplus approach, see also Brancaccio (2008). 
(29) Endogenous variables are: Y, ΔK, pi, R, pc, C, ΔLh, ΔVh, Fch, Nc, Ni, N, Ik, Pc, Pi, ΔLc, ΔLi, q, ε, pEc, Fcb. 
Exogenous variables are: iL, α, ac, ai, b, μ, w, θc, ΔENc. Parameters are: c1, c2, k1, k2, k3, k4. 
(30) Notice that this equation substitutes Minsky’s demand price of capital goods. 
(31) In other words, we assume – in the wake of Marx – that there is a ‘reserve army’ of 
unemployed workers, all eager to work at the going wage. 
(32) This becomes clear once we relax the assumption that banks use the entirety of their income 
to purchase only equities issued by c-firms. 
(33) We refer the reader to footnote 24. 
(34) See, for instance, Lavoie and Godley (2001-02), and Dos Santos and Zezza (2008). We also 
refer the reader to Passarella (2011A, 2011B). A different ‘closure’ of the model is supplied by Ryoo 
(2010), who assumes that the residual variable is the proportion of investment that is equity-financed. 
(35) This latter is equal to:   /         /    . 
(36) Notice also that another cause of the financial fragility is the practice of ‘stiffening’ the 
temporal structure of liabilities during the ascending phase of the cycle. Besides, mergers and 
takeovers have the effect – insofar as they are financed by debt – of increasing firms’ leverage ratio (see 
Passarella, 2010). 
(37) On this point, see Toporowski (2000, 2010), and Bellofiore, Halevi and Passarella (2010). 
(38) Fig. 2 shows that, if the stock buyback is ‘internal’ to the c-firm sector, then households (as a 
whole) cannot draw from the financial markets the liquidity that they need to pay off their bank debt. 
However, they can easily keep on renewing their bank debt, as the price of their own financial assets 
keeps on increasing, because of the inflow of c-firms’ savings (retained profits). The same goes for c-
firms’ purchase of derivatives (i.e. bank bonds) from banks and NBFI. By contrast, insofar as c-firms 
buy back their shares from households, these latter can pay off (part of) their bank debt, but only if 
they ‘de-accumulate’ (part of) their stock of assets. Data seem to indicate that the two cases describe 
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two different (subsequent) phases of the business cycle as well as describe the process of 
‘financialization’ on the whole. In fact, on the one hand, the process of financialization of western 
economies (which started at the end of the 1970s and continued to take place during the 1980s) has 
been associated with a long-term fall in the proportion of (fixed) investment which is financed by new 
issues. On the other hand, the equities-to-investment ratio decreased during the upswings (mainly 
because of the buy-back of stock within the production sector) and increased after the crises, such as 
the Wall Street crashes of 1987, 2000 and 2007 (see Ryoo, 2010; see also Passarella, 2011A). 
(39) In this case, households can resort to bank loans on the basis of their stock of assets. It is clear 
that this requires the central bank to pursue an ‘easy’ monetary policy. 
(40) Notice that the question of whether this rise is either an outcome of the pressure of demand 
for credit on a non-infinitely elastic supply (as claimed by Minsky), or the result of an autonomous 
decision taken by the central bank in order to hold inflation down (as claimed by ‘horizontalist’ Post-
Keynesians), does not change the basic issue. In both cases, the fragility of firms has been endogenously 
produced as the result of their ‘rational’ behavior in a world of radical uncertainty. On this point, we 
refer the reader also to Passarella (2010). 
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Fig. 1. The logical sequence of the monetary circuit. Government sector, foreign sector and central 
bank are assumed away. It is also assumed that households do not want to hoard bank deposits. 
Fig. 2. The paradoxical form of the ‘new’ monetary circuit. The broken arrow-lines show the 
weakening of the traditional monetary link between firms, banks and households. 
 Table 1. The transactions flow matrix of an artificial, ‘pure credit’, closed economy with two ‘productive’ sectors 
                                                           Sectors:  
1. Households 
2. Production sector 
3. Banks and NBFI 
Totals 
(row)  Entries:  c-firms i-firms 
In
co
m
e 
an
d
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 m
at
ri
x 1. Consumption –pc ∙ C +pc ∙ C   0 
2. Investment (capital goods)  {– pi ∙ ΔK} +pi ∙ ΔK   0 
3. Wages +W –Wc –Wi  0 
4. Interest on loans –iL ∙ ΔLh –iL ∙ ΔLc –iL ∙ ΔLi +iL ∙ ΔL 0 
5. Interest on deposits +iD ∙ ΔD[h] [+iD ∙ ΔDc] [+iD ∙ ΔDi] –iD ∙ ΔD 0 
6. Return on bank bonds  +iB ∙ ΔB  –iB ∙ ΔB 0 
7. Dividends +Fch + Fb –Fc  +Fcb – Fb  0 
Current savings (acc. memo) Sh Fuc Fui Fub Stot 
F
lo
w
 o
f 
fu
n
d
s 
m
at
ri
x 
8. Δ Bank deposits –ΔD[h] [–ΔDc] [–ΔDi] +ΔD 0 
9. Δ Bank loans +ΔLh +ΔLc +ΔLi –ΔL 0 
10. Δ Bank bonds (‘derivatives’)  +ΔB  –ΔB 0 
11. Δ Equities – pEc ∙ ΔEch – pEb ∙ ΔEb +pEc ∙ ΔENc  – pEc ∙ ΔEcb + pEb ∙ ΔEb  0 
Net capital trans. (acc. memo) Sh Fuc Fui Fub Stot 
Totals (column) 0 0 0 0 0 
Net worth (acc. memo) Sh + ΔpEc ∙ Ech(–1) + ΔpEb ∙ Eb(–1) Fuc – ΔpEc ∙ ENc(–1) + Δpi ∙ K(–1) Fui –Δpi ∙ K(–1) Fub + ΔpEc ∙ Ecb(–1) – ΔpEb ∙ Eb(–1) Stot + Δp ∙ Kt–1 
Notes: In the top part of Table 1, a ‘+’ before a magnitude denotes a receipt, whereas ‘–’ denotes a payment; in the bottom part, a ‘+’ denotes a source of funds, whereas ‘–’ 
denotes a use of funds; it is assumed that there is neither a government sector nor a foreign sector; both capital depreciation and inventory stocks are assumed to be negligible. 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Glossary of symbols 
ac, ai Average output per worker of c-firms and i-firms, respectively  ΔL New loans created by banks (total) 
Aj Internal funds of the j-th firm  ΔLc, ΔLi New loans to c-firms and i-firms, respectively 
b Capital coefficient of c-firms  ΔLf New loans to productive sector 
ΔB Bank bonds (‘derivatives’) issued by banks and subscribed by c-firms  ΔLh New loans to households (consumer credit) 
C Quantity of consumer goods  Nc, Ni, N Employment of c-firms, i-firms and productive sector, respectively 
c1, c2 Consumption parameters  pc Price of consumer goods 
ch Share of households’ autonomous consumption on national income  Pc, Pi, Pf Monetary profits of c-firms, i-firms and productive sector, respectively 
ΔD[h] Amount of new bank deposits (hoarded by households)  pEb Price of equities issued by banks and other NBFI 
e Quantity of shares per unit of real investment  pEc Price of equities issued by c-firms 
ΔE[N]c New equities issued by c-firms [net of share repurchase]  pi Supply price of capital goods 
ΔEb New equities issued by banks and NBFI (and purchased by households)  pk[j] Demand price of capital goods 
ΔEcb New equities issued by c-firms and purchased by banks and NBFI  q[j] Tobin ‘q’ 
ΔEch New equities issued by c-firms and purchased by households  R, Rk Borrower’s risk function 
Fb Banks and NBFI’s dividends (distributed to households)  Ri Lender’s risk function 
Fc c- firms’ dividends (total)  rj Quasi-rent discount rate used by the j-th firm 
Fcb c- firms’ dividends distributed to banks and NBFI  vi Share of wages paid by i-firms on national income 
Fch c- firms’ dividends distributed to households  ΔVh, Vh-1 Net change in the worth of households and households’ wealth at time t – 1 
Fub Retained earnings of banks and NFBI  w Average wage paid to each worker 
Fuc Retained earnings of c-firms ( θcPc)   W  Total monetary wage-bill 
I0j Quantity of self-financed investment of j-th firm  Wc, Wi Wage bill paid by c-firms and by i-firms, respectively 
iB, iD, iL Rate of return on derivatives, bank deposits and bank loans, respectively  α Percentage of securitization of households’ debt 
Ir[j], ΔK Quantity of new capital goods  ε Number of new shares per unit of equity-financed real investment 
Ik Quantity of debt-financed investment   θb, θc Percentage of retained earnings of banks and c-firms, respectively 
k Share of productive investment on national income  λc, λf Investment leverage ratio of c-firms and productive sector, respectively 
k1 Accelerator coefficient   λj Investment leverage ratio of the j-th firm 
k2 Securitization coefficient   μ General mark-up 
Lcw, Liw Bank financing of the current production of c-firms and i-firms, respectively  πc c-firms’ profits to investment ratio 
Lk[j] Bank financing of the investment   σ Ratio of stock buyback to current issues 
 
 
